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PLannIng new 
Infrastructure  
Some Issues
Arthur Grimes
The presence of positive agglomeration 
elasticities found in New Zealand and 
elsewhere (see Maré, 2008; Maré and 
Graham, 2009) indicates that increasing 
returns to scale may be present in relation 
to some infrastructure investments. The 
possibility of such increasing returns 
needs to be accounted for in ex ante 
assessments of the benefits flowing from 
new infrastructure investments. Increasing 
returns mean that many infrastructure 
investments do not stand alone: analysis 
requires a network approach rather than a 
specific project analysis. 
The empirical work outlined in the 
companion article also points to the 
importance of considering the options 
role performed by certain infrastructure 
investments. The importance of network 
thinking and the consideration of 
options complicate the use of traditional 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) tools. Other 
complications also arise in relation 
to CBA, especially in determining the 
weightings given to current versus 
future benefits and to different types of 
benefit (especially consumption versus 
production benefits). This article indicates 
some of the issues that have surfaced 
as a consequence of the findings of the 
empirical studies. A fuller examination 
of these conceptual issues is provided in 
Grimes (2010a).1
Cost-benefit analysis
CBA is the standard tool used in New 
Zealand and elsewhere as a basis for 
decisions regarding infrastructure 
investments. It makes explicit the nature, 
size and timing of a project’s costs 
and benefits, covering both tangible 
and intangible items, and includes 
consideration of wider economic benefits 
(e.g. agglomeration externalities). 
As with any such tool, the analyst 
using CBA must adopt a range of 
assumptions. CBA is most useful when 
these assumptions apply equally to a 
range of alternatives, so that the outcome 
of a decision is invariant to the particular 
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assumptions made. For instance, it can 
be used with confidence when making 
comparisons between alternative projects 
designed to produce similar benefits (e.g. 
two roading choices designed to meet a 
similar need). 
The scope of a cost-benefit analysis 
must be appropriate for the issue at hand. 
If a project has synergies with other 
prospective investments, a project-specific 
CBA will provide an inadequate estimate 
of benefits if the interactions with other 
synergistic projects (i.e. the full network) 
are not taken into account. In many 
circumstances – for instance, upgrading 
a roading network – a network CBA is 
therefore required instead of a project-
specific CBA. (The latter may nevertheless 
still be useful where there are multiple 
ways of building a particular stretch of 
road within the network, provided the 
full network CBA is also undertaken.) 
The article by John Boshier in this issue 
and discussion in Grimes (2010a) deal 
with this issue in more depth.
Options and uncertainty
Investment is frequently undertaken under 
conditions of uncertainty with respect to 
many factors, including future demand, 
construction costs, future input costs, rival 
investments, complementary investments 
and the potential for new technologies. 
In some cases the uncertainty may relate 
to the investor’s own future actions, but 
in most cases it will relate to the actions 
of others. For long-lived investments, the 
uncertainties relate to actions of agents 
who may not be alive or active at the time 
the initial investment is considered. 
Investments in general-purpose 
technologies are especially beset with 
such uncertainties. At the time telegraph 
cables were first erected in New Zealand 
in the 19th century (under Julius Vogel’s 
infrastructure investment programme), 
no one could foresee that movies would 
one day be downloaded to an individual’s 
home from any point on the globe 
through such cables. 
These uncertainties may have a 
considerable impact on infrastructure 
investment. A classic result from 
the literature on ‘investment under 
uncertainty’ is that investments may face 
a high hurdle rate if information about 
future conditions unfolds over time 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The reason 
for this is that a project that today has 
a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) exceeding 
one (based on current information) 
may have a BCR next period (or later) 
that is less than one (based on updated 
information). By waiting for further 
information to unfold, the risk of 
investing in a poorly performing project 
can be lessened. A conventional CBA 
that ignores uncertainty and learning 
therefore provides an insufficient basis 
for making investment decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty.
The logic of delaying investments (or 
raising the hurdle rate) under conditions 
of uncertainty may be reversed where 
a project forms part of a sequence 
of potential projects in which future 
ones can only be undertaken if the 
initial investment is itself undertaken. 
If information about returns to future 
projects is forthcoming only after the 
initial project is completed, the initial 
investment creates a valuable option 
for potential investment in subsequent 
projects. For instance, consider an 
investment in fibre for broadband. 
The fibre itself constitutes the initial 
investment; subsequent projects relate to a 
range of private sector investment choices 
by firms that may wish to utilise the new 
technology. At the time of the initial 
(fibre) decision, the future returns to the 
private sector’s investments are uncertain; 
the expected net returns (given current 
information) of the fibre investment plus 
future private investments may even be 
negative (i.e. a BCR of less than one). 
However, as shown in Grimes (2010a), 
it may still be worthwhile investing in 
fibre because, unless the initial fibre 
investment is undertaken, there may be 
no possibility that the future firm-specific 
investments can be undertaken. Those 
future investments will be undertaken if 
they are privately optimal for those firms, 
but these decisions will only be revealed 
in the future and will be conditional 
on the fibre already being in place. The 
initial public investment therefore creates 
the option for subsequent investment 
opportunities and hence for increased 
national income, and may be worthwhile 
even though no private sector participant 
would embark on the initial investment 
programme.2
The key to this result is that 
investment in the initial project creates 
an option to reap high returns through 
prospective future investments, with no 
obligation to invest in those projects 
where circumstances indicate that returns 
will instead be low. The potential for such 
options means that analysis for a project 
may, on occasions, need to incorporate 
a list of prospective (but uncertain) 
opportunities that may arise due to the 
completion of the project. Furthermore, 
the analysis must be undertaken at a 
national scale, rather than relating solely 
to the returns to the initial investor.
A corollary of the options approach is 
that disinvestment decisions must account 
for future opportunities that may be lost 
if existing infrastructure were scrapped. 
This insight is particularly relevant where 
large sunk costs are involved (rail freight 
lines are one such example).
Options analysis means that a BCR 
greater than one (within a conventional 
CBA) is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to make investment 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
and learning. Some projects with a BCR 
greater than one optimally should be 
delayed, whereas other projects with a 
BCR of less than one optimally should 
proceed. Analyses that use certainty-
equivalent methods in the presence of 
uncertainty and learning are therefore 
flawed. 
... investment in the initial 
project creates an option 
to reap high returns 
through prospective 
future investments, with 
no obligation to invest 
in those projects where 
circumstances indicate 
that returns will instead be 
low.  
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Discount rate
One of the most important decisions that 
must be taken when conducting a CBA, or 
using any other method to determine the 
net benefit of an infrastructure project, 
is how to trade off future against current 
net benefits. In order to arrive at a BCR 
or a net present value (NPV) figure, the 
trade-off between present and future net 
benefits is normally made through choice 
of an explicit discount rate. As implied 
by the multiplicity of discount rates used 
for infrastructure projects internationally, 
there is no single ‘correct’ discount rate 
that covers all project types. 
Nevertheless, some guidance can be 
given. Where returns from a project are 
monetary and can be reinvested in another 
project that in turn gives the same explicit 
rate of return (with the same risk profile) 
as the project under consideration, and 
where the project could be undertaken 
equally by another agent, a cost of capital 
(incorporating a market-derived risk 
premium) constitutes an appropriate 
discount rate for the project.
Even here, the choice of risk premium 
is far from trivial, and circumstances exist 
where a negative risk premium may be 
appropriate at a national level. Consider, 
for instance, an irrigation scheme, which 
has its highest pay-offs during times of 
drought. Empirical work demonstrates a 
causal link from drought to GDP decline 
in New Zealand (Buckle et al., 2007). If 
government is averse to negative shocks 
to national income, there is a case for 
government to support an irrigation 
scheme through provision of funds at 
a discount rate that reflects a negative 
price for risk. In other words, because 
the scheme can mitigate adverse national 
income fluctuations, it has a negative 
‘consumption beta’ and this makes it 
worthy of access to funds at a less than 
risk-free rate. If government is not 
concerned with fluctuations in national 
income, this result no longer holds and 
a market rate of return reflecting purely 
private risk is appropriate.
The issue of appropriate discount rate 
becomes even more difficult to determine 
where the benefit stream of a project in 
part comprises intangible consumption 
benefits, such as social benefits that 
cannot be monetised. In this case, the 
discount rate reflects the decision maker’s 
subjective trade-off between people 
across time (i.e. between generations). 
Consider, for instance, a government 
faced with the choice of investing in two 
projects. The first is a one-off purchase 
of 1,000 hip operations today for elderly 
people in need of the operation (and who 
otherwise could not afford one). Assume 
that this incurs a one-off cost of $10 
million which is lost to the government 
once the operations have been completed. 
The second project invests $10 million in 
a toll-road that yields a 7.5% compound 
real rate of return over 25 years (and where 
the returns can be reinvested at 7.5% 
real). The New Zealand government’s 
current discount rate used for roading 
projects is 8% real; thus, it would reject 
the toll-road proposal as having a BCR of 
less than one. 
What does this rejection mean? 
Investment of $10 million for 25 years at 
7.5% real would result in a capital sum 
of $61 million at that time. Assuming hip 
operations cost the same in real terms 
then as now, a government in 25 years 
time could conduct six times as many hip 
operations as now if it invested in the toll-
road instead of purchasing hip operations 
today. Use of an 8% real discount rate says 
that we would prefer to conduct 1,000 
hip operations today rather than invest 
that sum and have 6,000 hip operations 
in 25 years time. In other words, faced 
with consuming today or setting aside 
these funds to make the next generation 
six times as wealthy, the official choice in 
New Zealand is to consume today. 
Furthermore, current roading projects 
are generally not undertaken unless 
their BCR is considerably greater than 
one (using an 8% real discount rate). 
The effective trade-off between current 
consumption and wealth of the next 
generation is therefore effectively much 
greater than the ratio of 6 implied by the 
discount rate choice. Seen in the light of 
these official policies, New Zealand’s high 
rate of consumption out of income and 
low growth rate is understandable.
The nature of investments
New Zealand is an open economy with 
free migration internally and across the 
Tasman. In these circumstances, New 
Zealand needs to be considered as one 
region within a broader economy. A 
recent analysis for US states (Moretti, 
2010) demonstrates that increased 
demand for a region’s tradable goods 
raises employment in that industry and 
also raises demand for employees in non-
tradable industries, thus inducing net 
inward migration. If labour is not perfectly 
mobile across regions, the result is a rise 
in incomes across the regional economy. 
A similar result holds for an increase in 
tradable sector productivity that arises 
from an improvement in infrastructure 
(Grimes, 2009a, 2010a). The productivity 
improvement to firms in the tradable 
sector translates into income increases 
across the economy as returns to local 
resources are bid up in order to increase 
output in the more productive tradable 
sector. The effect is to relocate resources 
both within and between countries.
These results are important for 
interpreting the agglomeration findings 
in the Motu infrastructure programme 
(Maré, 2008; Maré and Graham, 2009). 
Rather than seeing a productivity-
enhancing infrastructure investment in 
Auckland as potentially taking resources 
away from the rest of New Zealand, it 
should instead be interpreted as boosting 
the return to factors of production in New 
Zealand. The resulting higher incomes 
attract additional resources (including 
labour) to this country and/or reduce the 
rather than seeing a 
productivity-enhancing 
infrastructure investment 
in auckland as potentially 
taking resources away 
from the rest of new 
Zealand, it should instead 
be interpreted as boosting 
the return to factors of 
production within new 
Zealand. 
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net outflow of labour and other resources 
to Australia.
Strategic and funding implications
The empirical work summarised in the 
companion article and the conceptual 
issues discussed in this one together 
suggest that a more strategic approach 
to infrastructure investment could be 
pursued in New Zealand than has been 
the case in recent decades. A national 
infrastructure strategy may concentrate 
on prioritising projects that: (i) service the 
internationally traded productive sector; 
(ii) exhibit network complementarities; 
and/or (iii) create opportunities for 
subsequent value-enhancing investments 
that take advantage of the initial 
investment project. 
These considerations, which are 
largely absent from conventional CBA 
evaluation, may be combined with use of 
a lower discount rate in order to prioritise 
projects that boost the productive base 
of the New Zealand economy for future 
generations.
Where projects are national in scale and 
have positive net pay-offs (after inclusion 
of network and other externalities and 
option values), they can be financed 
through debt, since the stream of benefits 
is available to service that debt. Where 
the effects are predominantly localised 
(for instance, with a motorway extension 
or new social amenities) another funding 
avenue is possible. Theory, and the 
empirical work cited here, shows that 
beneficial infrastructure investments 
with localised benefits result in an uplift 
in land values. This value uplift accrues 
to property owners who have not 
necessarily risked their own capital to 
undertake the infrastructure investment. 
The value uplift affords a base on which 
to raise revenue through targeted local 
authority rates (land taxes). Historically, 
similar mechanisms have been used to 
fund railway development in the United 
States and in New Zealand, and are used 
today in the United States through TIF 
(tax increment financing) funded projects 
(Coleman and Grimes, 2010a, 2010b). 
Further consideration of this approach, 
possibly in place of development 
contributions and financial contributions 
(under the Local Government Act and 
Resource Management Act respectively), 
is warranted in New Zealand.
Whichever funding mechanisms are 
used, there is a need in New Zealand 
to extend current approaches to infra-
structure planning so as to incorporate 
some of the analytical extensions to cost-
benefit analysis introduced by modern 
economic approaches. Incorporation of 
network externalities and option values, 
plus reconsideration of discount rates 
(especially in respect of differing types 
of benefits), are specific extensions to 
consider. The land value-based funding 
mechanisms then provide a funding 
option to finance further productive 
infrastructure investments, especially at 
the local level.
1 The analysis in Grimes (2010a) was funded by CAENZ (the 
Centre for Advanced Engineering New Zealand) and by the 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST 
grant MOTU0601). We thank FRST and CAENZ for their 
assistance.
2 Against this option must be weighed the option of delaying 
investment in a fibre network. This option may have value 
if cheaper fast broadband options (e.g. improved mobile 
technology) were potentially to become available in a 
relatively short timeframe, so enabling savings on the large 
costs of investing in a ubiquitous fibre network.
where projects are national 
in scale and have positive 
net pay-offs ... they can 
be financed through debt, 
since the stream of benefits 
is available to service that 
debt.  
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A one day forum on Monday 21 February 2011
Government Buildings lecture theatre one, Pipitea Campus,  
Victoria University of Wellington
The Costs of Crime: Toward  
Fiscal Responsibility forum will 
provide information on the fiscal 
and others costs of the impact 
of crime and policy measures 
to respond to it and generate 
discussion on cost-effective  
ways of responding to crime and 
repairing the harm caused by it.  
The primary focus will be on  
public expenditure but costs to  
non-governmental organizations  
will also be considered where 
relevant and possible. 
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University 
•	 Heather	Henare	and	Kiri	
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•	 Tony	Paine,	Victim	Support
Presented by Institute of 
Policy Studies and the 
Robson Hanan Trust
Email your details to 
ips@vuw.ac.nz for further 
information as it becomes 
available or to register to 
attend.  There is no fee to 
attend.
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